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York State Senate is currently considering a bill that proposes a
capped recovery for grief arising from the loss of a decedent's con-
sortium.42 It is regrettable, however, that until legislative action is
taken, the New York courts will continue to apply outdated prece-
dent blindly and to award less than the full value of human life in
wrongful death cases.
Richard F. Hans, Jr.
New York County Supreme Court refuses to apply discovery rule
to case brought by victim of childhood sexual abuse after expira-
tion of statute of limitations
In New York, the statute of limitations1 for a cause of action
commences when the claim "accrues." 2 In the absence of a statu-
tory definition, the New York Court of Appeals has interpreted the
term "accrues" as the date upon which the wrongful act occurred,
"even though the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of
the wrong or injury."'3 The harshness of this "strict accrual rule"'4
recovery for . . . loss of society, affection, conjugal fellowship and consortium.") (citation
omitted). No specific mention is made in Gonzalez of the need for statutory change.
42 See supra note 15; see also supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing
proposed statutory alterations).
' See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990). A statute of limitations sets "maxi-
mum time periods during which certain actions can be brought or rights enforced. After the
time period set out in the applicable statute of limitations has run, no legal action can be
brought regardless of whether any cause of action ever existed." Id. The underlying purpose
of a limitations period is to force a plaintiff to institute suit within a reasonable period of
time. See Developments in the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1185
(1950). A well-established policy reason in support of statutes of limitation is that a defend-
ant's "right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the [plaintiff's] right to
prosecute them." Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944). Insulating a defendant from stale claims, however, promotes justice only when the
plaintiff has "slumber[ed on his rights] until evidence has been lost, memories have faded,
and witnesses have disappeared." Id. at 349 (lack of "reckless haste" in pressing claim did
not bar action); see also 1 WK&M para. 201.01 (noting concerns regarding passage of time
on reliability and availability of evidence).
2 See CPLR 203(a) (McKinney 1991) ("The time within which an action must be com-
menced ... shall be computed from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the
claim is interposed.").
3 Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 300, 200 N.E. 824, 827
(1936). In Schmidt, the Court of Appeals held that the limitations period on an asbestos
exposure claim commenced when the plaintiff first inhaled the asbestos particles and not
when the plaintiff was diagnosed with asbestosis. Id.; accord Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 1010-11, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 967 (1982); Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 781, 391 N.E.2d
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is apparent in cases involving injuries that do not manifest them-
selves until years after the plaintiff has been violated.5 For in-
stance, adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse ("CSA") often
suffer psychological and emotional injuries that go unnoticed until
many years after the sexual abuse occurs.' Consequently, CSA vic-
1002, 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (1979).
' See Sheila L. Birnbaum, "First Breath's" Last Gasp: The Discovery Rule in Products
Liability Cases, 13 FORUM 279, 282 (1977) (noting that New York Court of Appeals first
enunciated strict accrual or "first breath" rule in 1936). The strict accrual rule triggers the
applicable statute of limitations "when there is a wrongful invasion of personal or property
rights" even if the plaintiff is unaware of any injury. Schmidt, 270 N.Y. at 300, 200 N.E. at
827.
, See Rodriguez v. Manhattan Medical Group, 77 N.Y.2d 217, 224, 567 N.E.2d 235, 239,
566 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1990). In Rodriguez, -the Court of Appeals held that the limitations
period on a medical malpractice claim commenced when the defendant left the plaintiff's
intrauterine device ("IUD") in place after having been retained for the specific purpose of
removing it, and not when the plaintiff discovered four years later that the device was em-
bedded in the uterus wall. Id. at 224, 567 N.E.2d at 239, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 197; see also
Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co. 62 N.Y.2d 888, 889, 467 N.E.2d 517, 517, 478 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854
(1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985). In Fleishman, the court of appeals affirmed two
consolidated appellate division decisions in a memorandum opinion holding that plaintiffs
injured by the deleterious effects of Diethylstilbestrol ("DES") were foreclosed from bring-
ing suit even though the injurious effects of the drug were not manifest until the statute of
limitations had expired. Id.
6 See Carolyn B. Handler, Note, Civil Claims of Adults Molested As Children: Matura-
tion of Harm and the Statute of Limitations Hurdle, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709, 734-35
(1987). Victims of CSA often meet the diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder
("PTSD"), a "clinically diagnosed mental disorder in which the victim avoids situations that
stimulate recall of traumatic events or experiences." CHESTER B. SCRIGNAR, POsT-TRAUMATIC
STRESS DISORDER: DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT, AND LEGAL ISSUES 138 (1984). PTSD is "marked
by attempts to repress psychologically unacceptable experiences until a later time in life
when it might be possible to cope with them." Id. at 139. A practical consequence of PTSD
is that many CSA victims do not acknowledge and deal with the sexual abuse they suffered
as children until they are years into adulthood. See James W. Harshaw III, Note, Not
Enough Time?: The Constitutionality of Short Statutes of Limitations for Civil Child Sex-
ual Abuse Litigation, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 753, 757 (1989). Although some victims of CSA recog-
nize and acknowledge that they had been sexually abused as children, they may not under-
stand how that conduct has damaged them or connect their current psychological and
emotional problems to the sexual abuse. Id. This problem is further compounded by the fact
that many of the injuries from sexual abuse, especially those that are sexual in nature, do
not manifest themselves until adulthood. See ROBERT M. HOROWITZ & HOWARD A. DAVID-
SON, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 329-30 (1984).
Sufferers of CSA often exhibit the following symptoms: lack of basic trust; low self-
esteem; poor sense of identity, including both general identity and sexual identity; lack of
sexual response; depression; suicidal tendencies; promiscuity; and alcohol abuse. See
BRANDT F. STEELE & HELEN ALEXANDER, Long-Term Effects of Sexual Abuse in Childhood,
in SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES (Patricia Beezley Mrazek & C. Henry
Kempe eds., 1981); see also HOROWITZ & DAVIDSON, supra, at 329-30 ("Adult survivors of
childhood sexual abuse may either become involved in prostitution as a lifestyle or they may
be unable to have normal, healthy sex lives and interpersonal relationships.").
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tims who seek redress from their abusers are often barred from
recovery by the statute of limitations.7 In recognition of this ineq-
uity, several courts in 'jurisdictions outside of New York have ap-
plied some form of the discovery rule, which fixes the date of ac-
crual at the time when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should
have discovered the injuries." The New York Court of Appeals,
however, has consistently refused to recognize the discovery rule9
7 See Handler, supra note 6, at 734-35. In New York, CSA victims have resorted to the
common law doctrines of equitable estoppel and duress as well as to the statutory tolling
exception for insanity in their attempts to overcome the statute of limitations defense. Id. at
721-22. To date, no court has accepted these arguments. Id. at 735. For example, in Burpee
v. Burpee, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 27, 1991, at 25, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County Aug. 15, 1991), the
plaintiff sought recovery for injuries resulting from sexual abuse that she experienced as a
child. Id. Contending that her claim was not barred, the plaintiff argued that the defendant
should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense and that
the statutory toll for insanity rendered her claim timely. Id. The court acknowledged that
the plaintiff's allegations, if true, warranted "the severest condemnation by all right-think-
ing persons of compassion," but noted that in New York it is well established that "psycho-
logical trauma and repression therefrom is insufficient to justify avoidance of the Statute of
Limitations in the name of equity." Id. at 26, col. 1. In addition, the court reasoned that
because the doctrine of equitable estoppel requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant's
affirmative conduct prevented her from discovering or commencing her action, mere silence
on the part of the defendant was insufficient. Id. at 26, col. 2. Finally, the court concluded
that the statutory toll for insanity was "intended 'to extend ... to only those individuals
who are unable to protect their legal rights because of an overall inability to function in
society,' not to individuals suffering from a 'mere post traumatic neurosis.'" Id. (quoting
McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 543, 548-49, 435 N.E.2d 1072, 1075, 450
N.Y.S.2d 457, 460 (1982)).
8 See Steven L. White, Note, Toward a Time-of-Discovery Rule for the Statute of Lim-
itations in Latent Injury Cases in New York State, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 113, 114 (1985).
Over the years, the judiciary has developed three variations on the discovey accrual rule.
Id. The first establishes the date of accrual at the time the plaintiff discovers or reasonably
should have discovered the injury. See, e.g., Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907, 909 (N.D.
1989) (claim for damages resulting from alleged incestuous abuse suffered as a child accrued
when plaintiff "kn[ew] or with reasonable diligence reasonably should [have] know[n] that a
potential claim exist[ed]"). The second variation sets the accrual date at the time the plain-
tiff discovers the injury and its cause. See, e.g., Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23, 25
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (claim for psychological and emotional damages resulting from alleged
sexual abuse accrued when plaintiff "discover[ed], or in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the fact and cause of the injury"). The final version of the discovery
rule provides that a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers the injury, the cause
of the injury, and that the injury was wrongfully inflicted by another. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1370 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (cause of action brought by adult survivor
of incestuous abuse accrued when "'plaintiff [knew] or reasonably should [have] know[n] of
any injury and also [knew] or reasonably should [have] know[n] that the injury was caused
by the wrongful acts of another' ") (quoting Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 421 N.E.2d
864, 868 (Ill. 1981)) (alterations in original).
9 See Fleishman, 62 N.Y.2d at 888, 467 N.E.2d at 518, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 854 ("Any de-
parture from the policies underlying these well-established precedents is a matter for the
Legislature and not the courts."); Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 1010,
1992]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:235
except under circumstances where the Legislature has expressly
provided for its application.'0 Recently, in Bassile v. Covenant
House," the New York County Supreme Court continued on this
course of abstention by refusing to apply the discovery rule to a
claim brought by an adult who was sexually abused during
childhood.12
In Covenant House, the plaintiff sought damages for severe
psychological and emotional injuries resulting from the alleged sex-
ual abuse that he experienced while residing at Covenant House in
1973.1" The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. 4 Empha-
sizing the "special nature of sexual abuse and the psychological
processes that it causes," the plaintiff argued that a discovery rule
should apply so as to delay the accrual of the claim to the time the
plaintiff discovered his injuries. 15 In granting the defendant's mo-
430 N.E.2d 1297, 1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (1981) ("we believe it to be inappropriate and
injudicious to intrude into an area best suited for legislative scrutiny."), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 967 (1982); see also CPLR 203(a) commentary at 140-41 (McKinney 1990) (observing
that New York Court of Appeals has steadfastly deferred to Legislature by refusing to adopt
discovery accrual rule despite Second Circuit's support for rule).
o See CPLR 214-a (McKinney 1990) (discovery rule for foreign objects in body in con-
text of medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice); id. 214-b (discovery rule for persons in-
jured by Agent Orange in Vietnam War); id. 214-c(2) (discovery rule for injury caused by
"latent effects of exposure to any substance").
" 575 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1991).
12 Id. at 236.
' Id. at 234. Covenant House is a not-for-profit corporation that was established by
Father Bruce Ritter in 1968 for the purpose of providing counseling and shelter for home-
less youths who are "alone and friendless on the harsh streets of [New York] City." Id. The
plaintiff became a resident of Covenant House in the spring of 1973, at which time he was
fourteen years old. Id. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff was repeatedly forced to
engage in sexual acts with Father Ritter from March through May 1973 and that the plain-
tiff suffered severe psychological and emotional damage as a result of these activities. Id.
" Id. The defendants in the action included Father Ritter, Covenant House, and the
Franciscans, an order of Roman Catholic priests belonging to the Order of the Conventual
Franciscan Friars of the Roman Catholic Church. Id.
The plaintiff asserted several causes of action against Father Ritter, including negli-
gence, malpractice as a social worker, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud and fraudulent
concealment. Id. The plaintiff's claim of negligence was based upon the doctrine of respon-
deat superior against both Covenant House and the Franciscans. Id. Except for the fraud
claim, a three year statute of limitations applied to all of the plaintiff's claims. Id. at 235
(citing CPLR 214). The fraud claim benefitted from a discovery rule that required the suit
to be commenced "within six years of the alleged misrepresentations. . . or two years after
the injured party learned of the fraud, whichever is later." Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the
trial court noted that "barring some unusual theory, the statute [of limitations] expired for
all but the fraud claim in 1980, and for that claim in 1983." Id.
" Id. at 235. The plaintiff contended that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disor-
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tion and dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, the trial court held
that "there is no [delayed] discovery rule in sex abuse cases in this
state.""6
Writing for the court, Justice Baer noted that "New York
caselaw makes clear that there is no delayed discovery rule gener-
ally available."' 7 Notwithstanding the harsh effect that such a rul-
ing would have on victims of sexual abuse,18 Justice Baer reasoned
that the Court of Appeals has consistently "made it plain that it
regards departures from [the strict accrual] rule in particular cate-
gories of wrong to be a subject for resolution by the Legislature."'"
Identifying some of the evidentiary problems that may be encoun-
tered in applying the delayed discovery rule to claims of sexual
abuse,20 Justice Baer, though not unsympathetic to the plaintiff's
der, as most victims of sexual abuse do, resulting in "long-delayed psychological damage."
Id. Moreover, the plaintiff urged that "it would be unjust to allow the statute of limitations
to expire before the victim of abuse could realistically be able to become aware of the wrong
inflicted." Id. at 235-36.
16 Id. at 236. "A court of this state is not empowered to extend the statutory periods
out of sympathy for a plaintiff or regret at a possible claim raised too late." Id. at 235 (citing
CPLR 201).
17 Id. at 236. "As Judge McLaughlin puts it, 'New York has a long tradition of hostility
toward holding the limitations period in abeyance pending actual discovery of the injury.'"
Id. (citation omitted).
18 Id. at 235 (characterizing allegations contained in plaintiff's complaint as "truly
horrifying").
,9 Id. at 236. Justice Baer observed that prior to the Legislature's enactment of sections
214-a, 214-b, and 214-c of the CPLR, the Court of Appeals had consistently rejected the
contention that "it is unjust and unfair in toxic tort and similar cases to require that the
statute of limitations begin running from the time of the invasion of the plaintiff's body
rather than from the later point at which the injury became known to the plaintiff." Id.
(citing, inter alia, Goldsmith v. Howmedica, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 120, 491 N.E.2d 1097, 500
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1986)).
Were the Court of Appeals willing to entertain "chart[ing] a new path" to sustain the
plaintiff's claim by applying a delayed discovery rule, Justice Baer concluded that a more
compelling argument could be made for applying such a relaxed procedural requirement to
toxic tort claims than to claims alleging sexual abuse. Id. Justice Baer reached this conclu-
sion first by contrasting the type of knowledge possessed by each victim. Id. Specifically,
toxic tort victims "have no reason to know [of the injury] until physical symptoms
manifest[ ] themselves" while some sex abuse victims "would likely have an awareness of
having undergone the acts, lacking only an appreciation of the damage caused." Id. Next,
Justice Baer pointed out that toxic tort victims "will unquestionably be suffering from a
disease," leaving open for dispute only the issue of the defendant's proximate cause. Id.
However, in addition to the causation issue, sex abuse cases also present difficulties due to
the "less objectively verifiable nature of the damage asserted." Id.
20 Id. at 238. Specifically, the Covenant House court stated that "many complex and
even conflicting considerations" are involved, including "problems of proof such lost wit-
nesses, [and] vanish[ing] memories," as well as "expert medical and psychological evidence."
Id. at 237-38. Because CSA cases "depend upon the recollection of incidents that occurred
1992]
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plight,2' felt bound by the dictates of New York State's highest
court and concluded that "if a judicial modification of the law is
required, a trial judge is not the proper person to do it."22 Conse-
quently, reiterating the sentiment of the court of appeals, the Cov-
enant House court determined that without the Legislature's ex-
press approval, the application of the discovery rule to sex abuse
claims would be "'inappropriate and injudicious.' "23
In 1981, the New York State Legislature amended the CPLR
to provide for a statute of limitations discovery rule for Vietnam
veterans seriously injured as a result of exposure to phenoxy herbi-
cides ("Agent Orange"). 4 Subsequently, in 1986 the CPLR was
amended to provide for a statute of limitations discovery rule for
victims of toxic torts injured by the latent effects of exposure to
certain substances and materials.2 5 Legislative policy pronounce-
ments accompanying both amendments indicated that the Legisla-
ture believed an extension of the statute of limitations under such
circumstances was necessary in light of the fact that toxic tort and
Agent Orange victims are injured "without perceptible trauma"
and are "blamelessly ignorant of the cause of the injury. '2 6 It is
in childhood," they are inherently "delicate" in that "[a] child is more likely to misunder-
stand events than is an adult and the more distant events are, the less clearly they will be
recalled accurately." Id. at 237.
In addition to evidentiary problems, the Covenant House court indicated concern for
the enormous stigma that attaches to the accused sexual abuser. Id. Thus, while acknowl-
edging that the statute of limitations should be "adjusted in some way to favor plaintiffs in
sex abuse cases," the court in Covenant House questioned whether a discovery rule is the
"perfect solution." Id. at 238 (suggesting that some objective confirmation of injury be re-
quired or maximum time limit be imposed on any toll).
21 See id. at 238 ("I reach this conclusion without enthusiasm, aware that the plaintiff
asserts that he was the victim of a most grievious wrong.").
22 Id.
A trial judge may well be required in particular cases to carry the law to points at
which it has not yet arrived, or to fill in the interstices left by the rulings of higher
courts. But where the courts of this state, especially the highest, have declared
with consistency what the law is, it is not the province of the trial judge to opt for
something different.
Id.
23 Id. at 236 (quoting Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 1011, 430
N.E.2d 1297, 1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 967 (1982)).
24 See CPLR 214-b (McKinney 1990).
25 See id. 214-c.
26 Ch. 266, § 1, [1981] N.Y. Laws 466 (McKinney). The legislative findings accompany-
ing the statutory amendment for victims suffering from exposure to Agent Orange were as
follows:
[In enacting statutes of limitation,] the legislature ha[s] been principally moti-
vated by the desire to discourage "belated litigation." Belated litigation [does] not
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submitted that, consistent with the rationale employed for ex-
tending the limitations period for Agent Orange and other toxic
tort victims, the limitations period applicable to CSA claims
should be extended to allow CSA victims who are "blamelessly ig-
norant" of the cause of their injuries to bring suit within a fixed
period of time after the discovery of their injuries.
Although victims of CSA are generally cognizant of the abuse
they experience at the time it occurs, the psychological repression
of that experience and the consequent concealment of the abuse
that commonly follows causes these victims to blamelessly ignore
the wrongfulness of the abuser's actions.2 7 Thus, the dormant na-
ture of the psychological injuries resulting from CSA are no differ-
ent from the latent physical injuries suffered by one who has in-
haled a toxic substance but has failed to manifest symptoms of a
disease until years after the exposure occurred.2 8
A bill that would amend the CPLR to provide a discovery ac-
crual rule for victims of CSA was recently introduced in the New
York State Senate.2 9 The proposed amendment provides that a
victim of sexual abuse may bring a claim "within three years after
such person attains the age of twenty-one or within three years
after such person discovers or reasonably should have discovered
that an injury was caused by an act of abuse which occurred when
such person was less than eighteen years of age, whichever occurs
later." 30 In acknowledgment of the fact that many survivors of
serve the interests of justice since protracted delays in litigating issues result[s] in
the failing memory of witnesses and the disappearance of evidence that [is] rele-
vant and germane to such issues. It was never the intent of the legislature in im-
posing limitations, to foreclose the citizens of this state from prosecuting legiti-
mate claims, provided such claims are diligently and expeditiously pursued. An
exception to the general period of limitation rule is required when the pathological
effects of an injury occurs without perceptible trauma and the victim is blame-
lessly ignorant of the cause of the injury.
Id.; see also Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 682, N.Y. Laws (April 20, 1976),
reprinted in [1986] N.Y. Laws 3182 (McKinney) ("This Bill... repeals th[e] archaic [strict
accrual] rule and replaces it with a fair and simple rule which permits a person to discover
his or her injury before the statutory time period for suit begins to run.").
27 See supra note 6 (discussing psychological and emotional injuries of CSA survivors).
28 See Handler, supra note 6, at 738. The injuries to victims of both toxic torts and
CSA are "slow-starting" and often go unnoticed until after the applicable statute of limita-
tions has run. Id. "As with the rationale for the toxic tort victim, the [CSA] plaintiff, who
could not have known of [his or] her cause of action, cannot be accused of 'slumbering' on
[his or] her rights." Id. (citing Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321
U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
28 See N.Y.S. 5461, 1991-1992 Regular Sess. (1991).
30 Id.
1992]
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CSA do not discover the "emotional ramifications of such abuse
until years after the abuse occurred," the proposed "legislation
would remove the barrier created by the... [strict accrual rule] in
order to enable survivors of child sexual abuse to bring civil actions
against their abusers."3 1
Under current New York law, adults who were sexually abused
as children are often required to bring suit against their alleged
abusers years before they are aware of the extent of psychological
and emotional damage from which they suffer. Although the court
in Covenant House recognized that such victims are afforded only
an elusive opportunity to seek recompense from those who have
abused them, the court was nonetheless bound by precedent to
hold that any modification to the strict accrual rule should be left
to the Legislature. The recent proposal to amend the CPLR by
providing a discovery rule to the statute of limitations for victims
of CSA suggests that the Legislature is responsive not only to the
cries of CSA victims, who have been locked out of New York
courts, but also to the judges who are bound by existing law to
throw away the key. It is now incumbent upon the Legislature to
enact the proposed amendment into law in order to prevent people
who abuse children from using the law as a shield against those
whom they have abused.
Melanie Mandery
New York Court of Appeals holds that claimant under SEQRA
must show special injury to establish standing to challenge envi-
ronmental assessment performed by local agency
Environmental policy acts such as the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act ("NEPA")' and New York's State Environmental
Quality Review Act ("SEQRA")2 require federal or state agencies3
31 Memorandum in Support of N.Y.S. 5461 (1991).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c(a) (1988). The purpose of NEPA is to create a national policy
of preventing damage to and promoting understanding of the environment. Id. § 4321. The
Act mandates that federal, state, and local governments use all "practicable means" to fur-
ther this policy. Id. § 4331(a); see also WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 697-
704 (1977) (providing overview of NEPA's objectives); Neil Orloff, SEQRA: New York's Ref-
ormation of NEPA, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1128, 1129 (1982) (NEPA passed in response to "lack of
attention by officials to environmental consequences of their decisions").
' N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1991).
Twenty-eight states have enacted environmental statutes modeled after NEPA (the so-
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